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BLD-251        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-2395 
 ___________ 
 
 JOHN RUFF, 
        Appellant 
 v. 
 
HEALTH CARE ADMINISTRATOR; KATHRYN MCCARTY; SCI COAL 
TOWNSHIP; SCI COAL TOWNSHIP MEDICAL STAFF; P. A. BRIAN DAVIS; P.A. 
JESSE COLABINE; M. D. MICHAEL WEISNER; DAVID SABBAR 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 10-cv-00603) 
 District Judge:  Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
 or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
July 28, 2011 
 Before:  SLOVITER, JORDAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges  
 
 (Opinion filed: August 17, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 John Ruff appeals two orders of the District Court:  one sua sponte dismissed his 
civil rights claims against defendants SCI-Coal Township, SCI-Coal Township’s Medical 
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Staff, and Kathryn McCarthy, and the other granted the motion to dismiss of defendants 
Physician Assistant (P.A.) Brian Davis, P.A. Jesse Colabine, Dr. Michael Weisner, and 
X-ray Technician David Sabbar.  Because the appeal presents no substantial question, we 
will summarily affirm. 
I. 
In March 2010, Ruff filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C.  
§ 1983, alleging improper treatment of injuries sustained during his incarceration at SCI-
Coal Township.  Ruff alleged that around October 23, 2007, he suffered a rib injury.  He 
was examined by P.A. Brian Davis, who neglected to order an x-ray of Ruff’s rib area.  
Approximately two years later, upon Ruff’s complaints of moderate pain and abnormal 
growth in his rib area, P.A. Colabine ordered x-rays to be taken.  Sabbar took Ruff’s x-
ray, which revealed a rib fracture.  Dr. Weisner examined the x-ray and advised Ruff that 
his pain stemmed from a rib fracture and that re-breaking the rib may be required to allow 
it to heal fully.  Ruff’s complaint named as defendants SCI-Coal Township, SCI-Coal 
Township’s Medical Staff, and Kathryn McCarthy—the prison Health Care 
Administrator—claiming that they were responsible for the allegedly inadequate medical 
care.   
In an April 14, 2010 order, the District Court sua sponte dismissed Ruff’s claims 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), but granted him leave to amend.  Ruff filed an 
amended complaint on May 18, 2010, which named P.A. Davis, P.A. Colabine, Dr. 
Weisner, and Sabbar as defendants.  Ruff specifically alleged that these defendants 
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violated his Eighth Amendment right to adequate medical care.  P.A. Davis, P.A. 
Colabine, and Dr. Weisner subsequently moved for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  On April 8, 2011, the District Court granted that 
motion.
1
  Ruff appealed. 
II. 
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and our review is plenary.  
See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (plenary review of order 
dismissing claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)); Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. 
v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2010) (plenary review of order 
granting motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)).  In reviewing a district court’s dismissal 
for failure to state a claim, “we accept as true all well-pled factual allegations in the 
complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them, and we affirm the 
order of dismissal only if the pleading does not plausibly suggest an entitlement to 
relief.”  Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 F.3d 237, 242 (3d Cir. 2008). 
We may summarily affirm a district court’s judgment if the appeal does not raise a 
substantial question.  3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  We may affirm on any basis 
supported by the record.  See Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 2000).  We 
are of course mindful that a pro se litigant’s complaint is to be construed liberally.  See 
                                                 
1
 Despite being issued a summons, Sabbar neither returned it nor entered an 
appearance in this case.  Nevertheless, in its April 8, 2011 order the District Court 
dismissed the claims against Sabbar pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 
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Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). 
III. 
In order to establish a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that:  (1) the 
conduct complained of was committed by persons acting under color of state law; and (2) 
the conduct violated a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of 
the United States.  Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc).  We 
separately analyze whether Ruff failed to state a claim against SCI-Coal Township, SCI-
Coal Township’s Medical Staff and McCarthy, and whether he failed to state a claim 
against P.A. Davis, P.A. Colabine, Dr. Weisner, and Sabbar. 
A.  Dismissal of the claims against SCI-Coal Township, SCI Coal Township’s 
Medical Staff, and Kathryn McCarthy 
 The District Court sua sponte dismissed Ruff’s claims as to SCI-Coal Township, 
SCI-Coal Township’s Medical Staff, and Kathryn McCarthy, for failure to state a claim 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  This was not error.  The District Court properly 
concluded that Ruff cannot sue SCI-Coal Township or the prison’s medical department 
itself because these entities are not “persons” under § 1983.  See Fischer v. Cahill, 474 
F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973) (per curiam). 
In addition, the District Court correctly held that Ruff failed to state a claim 
against Kathryn McCarthy.  To be liable under § 1983, a defendant must have some 
personal involvement in the underlying unconstitutional conduct.  See Rode v. 
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that a plaintiff must establish 
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that the defendants “have personal involvement in the alleged wrongs [which] . . . can be 
shown through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and 
acquiescence,” provided that the allegations are made with appropriate particularity).  
Ruff did not allege McCarthy’s knowledge and acquiescence with the required 
particularity; a review of Ruff’s complaint reveals no allegations giving rise to a plausible 
inference that McCarthy was personally involved in the complained-of conduct, or that 
she otherwise denied Ruff his constitutional rights.  Accordingly, the District Court 
properly dismissed Ruff’s claims against SCI-Coal Township, SCI Coal Township’s 
Medical Staff, and Kathryn McCarthy. 
B.  Dismissal of the claims against P.A. Davis, P.A. Colabine, Dr. Weisner, and 
David Sabbar 
The District Court properly dismissed claims against P.A. Colabine, Dr. Weisner, 
and Sabbar.  As noted above, liability under § 1983 is dependent upon a defendant’s 
personal involvement in the underlying unconstitutional conduct.  See Sutton v. Rasheed, 
323 F.3d 236, 249 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207).  A review of Ruff’s 
complaint reveals no allegations giving rise to a plausible inference that P.A. Colabine, 
Dr. Weisner, or Sabbar was personally involved in the October 2007 medical 
mistreatment.  In fact, they did not contribute any medical assistance until 2009, when 
they aided in properly diagnosing Ruff’s injury.   
The District Court also properly dismissed Ruff’s claim against P.A. Davis.  To 
state a valid Eighth Amendment claim of medical mistreatment, a prisoner “must allege 
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acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious 
medical needs.”  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).   Further, “a complaint that 
a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not 
state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.”  Id.; see also 
Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077, 1081 (3d Cir. 1976) (“Neglect, 
carelessness or malpractice is more properly the subject of a tort action in the state 
courts.”).   
We agree with the District Court that Ruff’s amended complaint has alleged no 
facts suggesting that P.A. Davis was deliberately indifferent to Ruff’s medical needs.  
While Ruff faults P.A. Davis for failing to order a rib x-ray, there is no averment 
suggesting an x-ray was necessary, or that P.A. Davis’s medical judgment was 
unreasonable.  See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845 (1994) (“[P]rison officials who 
act reasonably cannot be found liable under the [Eighth Amendment].”); Durmer v. 
O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[P]rison authorities are accorded considerable 
latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of prisoners.”).  Although it is unfortunate that 
Ruff’s fractured rib went undisclosed for two years, P.A. Davis’s medical choice to not 
order an x-ray in March 2007, at most exhibits negligence, which is insufficient to state a 
cognizable Eighth Amendment claim.  See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. 
IV. 
 For the reasons given in this opinion, we will summarily affirm the judgment of 
the District Court.  
